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Abstract: In this article I intend to articulate the cognitive value of literary fic-
tion in accordance with Peter Lamarque’s opacity thesis, avoiding the pitfall of
formalism to which the opacity thesis risks being reduced. In the first part, I dis-
cuss the problems of the distinction between opacity and transparency in the case
of literary fiction. In the second part, I thematise the reader’s interest in reading
literary fiction and analyse it in terms of an interest at a distance. This examina-
tion enables me to articulate the cognitive value of literary fiction as intrinsic to
the reader’s experience. The main argument in support of this approach is based
on an observation that I borrow from Roman Ingarden’s reflections on the literary
artwork, according to which the reader’s focus on the literary fictional narrative as
a whole is what distinguishes the experience of reading literary fiction from reading
other kinds of texts.
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I examine the question of how cognition is involved in the
experience of literary fiction. This examination differs from the question con-
cerning the truth value of literary fiction. The latter has dominated the stakes
in the contemporary debate, opposing the no-truth theory to those defending
the truth value of literary fiction in terms of subjective knowledge theory or in
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terms of moral philosophy.1 Although the no-truth theory provides good ar-
guments against its opponents in rejecting the instrumentalisation of literary
fiction that the latter seem to take for granted, I consider that the reduction
of the question of the cognitive value of literary fiction to its truth value ob-
scures a broader view of the experience of literary fiction, in particular the
aesthetic, poetic and cognitive aspects of this experience and their interplay.2
The question: ‘In what way is cognition involved in the experience of
literary fiction?’ is not new. Roman Ingarden dedicated a whole book to this
issue, Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks (1968). However, it is not
my intention to summarise or actualise the results of Ingarden’s examination.
My starting point, from which I revisit elements of Ingarden’s work, is the
opacity thesis, which I borrow from Peter Lamarque’s book, The Opacity
of Narrative (2014). The opacity thesis states that in the case of literary
fiction, ‘the events and characters that make up the content are constituted
by the mode of their presentation in the narrative’.3 Through his use of italics,
Lamarque draws particular attention to the notion of being ‘constituted’ in
order to clarify that the relation between the mode of presentation and the
content, as expressed by the opacity thesis, is not relative but intrinsic in the
case of literary fiction.
In the first part of this article, I argue that the opacity thesis changes
the debate about the cognitive value of literary fiction, and I examine how it
presents challenging new questions about this issue. From this perspective, in
the second part, I examine the experience to which literary fiction gives rise,
focussing in particular on one feature of this experience in which, as I intend
to show, the aesthetic and the cognitive dimensions are jointly involved. I
approach this aspect by examining the interest the reader has in reading
literary fiction. This interest, I argue, is marked by a distance and I describe
the different ways in which this distance specifies the experience of literary
fiction.
I will not go into certain preliminary aspects of the debate on the cognitive
value of literary fiction. I take it for granted that the experience of literary
fiction necessarily presupposes linguistic competencies and familiarity with
the language in which the literary fiction is written. I define literary fiction
in terms of a written (or recited) narrative which represents a fictional world.
Let us take this definition as a starting point for the following examination.
I. OPACITY THESIS AND THE THEORY OF LITERARY
FICTION
Peter Lamarque considers opacity to be ‘a prominent feature of literary fic-
tional narratives’.4 I call this view the ‘opacity thesis’ and my intention is to
examine in what way this thesis contributes to a theory of literary fiction. It
may not come as a surprise that it changes the debate on the cognitive value
of literary fiction by drawing attention to the reading experience. In fact,
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the opacity thesis considers the reading experience as an a priori condition
for any proposition about the cognitive value of literary fiction; for, if the
content of literary fiction is constituted by the mode of presentation of events
and characters in the narrative, as Lamarque argues, then the question con-
cerning the cognitive relevance of literary fiction can only be addressed by
paying particular attention to the linguistic, stylistic and narrative means of
presenting a content. As such, the opacity thesis is clearly opposed to the re-
ductive operations characteristic of the propositional theory of literary truth,
which claims that ‘literary works are construed as having the constitutive aim
of advancing truths about human concerns by means of general propositions
implicitly or explicitly contained in them’.5
However, the relevance of the opacity thesis to the debate on the cogni-
tive value of literary fiction appears in a more radical form when confronted
with the subjective knowledge theory. According to this theory, the reader
acquires knowledge from engagement with literary fiction, not in the sense
of receiving information about something (knowing that), but in the sense
of living through the experience of what it is like to be in a situation of a
particular kind, as described by the narrative of literary fiction.6 According
to this view, the way in which the experience is described in literary fiction
is important and requires literary means of expression, since the possibility
of the reader living through the experience of what it is like depends on the
expressive and authentic qualities of the description of this experience. It
seems, then, that the subjective knowledge theory of literary fiction accepts
the basic principle of the opacity thesis and may be considered as an elabora-
tion of this thesis in literary theory. However, this is not the case insofar as
the subjective knowledge theory confuses the experience of reading literary
fiction, which describes a situation using a narrative, with having an actual
experience of this situation. Moreover, it fails to consider the experience of
reading literary fiction as an experience sui generis and to analyse the specific
literary interest the reader has in reading literary fiction.7
Rejecting both the propositional and subjective knowledge theories, it
becomes clear how the opacity thesis changes the debate on the cognitive
value of literary fiction. In fact, it refuses any reduction of the experience of
literary fiction to a concept of knowledge external to this experience and it
invites a re-examination of the cognitive value of literary fiction within this
experience and in connection with the literary value attributed to literary
fiction. In this sense, the opacity thesis changes the stakes of the debate by
transforming the focus on what kind of knowledge is conveyed by literary
fiction into a preliminary question concerning the kind of experience to which
literary fiction invites the reader. In doing so, it appears to understand
literary fiction primarily as an aesthetic experience, to which the question
concerning its cognitive value is subordinated.
Precisely on this last point, however, the opacity thesis runs the risk of
being unsuitable as a theory of literary fiction, as long as it does not clarify
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what kind of interest and what kind of cognition are involved in reading
literary fiction. It may seem that it overlooks the cognitive relevance of
reading fiction altogether and that it falls back into a kind of formalism. Let
us briefly consider the issues.
First, formulated in terms of its general claim, the opacity thesis seems to
state something trivial. It draws attention to the indivisibility of form and
content in the case of literary fictional narratives. That the mode of presen-
tation is constitutive of the content of the narrative means that expression in
literary fiction cannot be substituted by another expression without running
the risk of changing the content of the narrative. It is clear that this for-
mulation of the opacity thesis obstructs any attempt to define the cognitive
value of literary fiction by means of a general proposition or a conceptual re-
description, as occurs, for example, in judgments such as: ‘in Franz Kafka’s
The trial human beings are victims of impersonal and indifferent forces out-
side their control’.8 It is also clear that this formulation of the opacity thesis
is able to draw a sharp distinction between literary fiction and philosophi-
cal discourse, to which the indivisibility of form and content does not apply.
One can ask, however, whether this thesis of the indivisibility of form and
content can be considered a distinctive feature of literary fiction and whether
it does not appear in different linguistic contexts whenever metaphors, rules
or fixed expressions are used. Moreover, one can also argue that the indivis-
ibility of form and content does not hold true in the case of literary fiction.
It is possible to translate a novel or to summarise a novel’s plot and judge
the quality of the novel’s translation or plot summary with regard to their
adequacy to the content of the novel’s original form. Some novels, such as
Raymond Queneau’s Exercises in Style, have explicitly challenged the idea
of the indivisibility of form and content by presenting the same events from
different perspectives.
The opacity thesis does not seem, therefore, to be either a sufficient or
necessary condition for defining a central feature of literary fiction. As a
result, the opacity thesis has been reformulated to be understood as qualifying
the experience of reading literary fiction. If it is possible to say that there are
degrees of opacity in literary fiction and that opacity increases, as Lamarque
argues, ‘to the extent that the content of the narrative is deemed – under
certain interests and no doubt under increasingly fine-grained specification –
to be dependent on the manner of its presentation’, one may conclude that
opacity is interest-relative.9 In this case, opacity is less an intrinsic quality of
a kind of text, than an interest brought to the text, and the opacity thesis
consists in claiming that, in the context of literary fiction, the reader reads for
opacity insofar as the reader is interested in the experience of literary fiction.
This reformulation of the opacity thesis need not contradict the previous one,
if one accepts that the specific attention given to the precise manner in which
the content is presented is constitutive of the literary value of literary fiction.
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In order to fully understand the implications of this reformulation of the
opacity thesis, it is important to recall the distinction that Lamarque makes
between opacity and transparency. While reading for opacity is an essential
feature of the experience of reading literary fiction and constitutive of the
appreciation of its literary value, reading for transparency is not. Whereas
particular attention to the specific manner in which the narrative’s content
is presented is an intrinsic feature of reading for opacity, reading for trans-
parency is defined as an interest in the narrative’s content identity. Lamarque
uses the term ‘substitution of identity’ to clarify this. The term is meant to
establish an equivalence between transparency and extensionality, which, in
the case of literary fiction, as Lamarque underlines, is not preservation of
truth but preservation of narrative content.10 In other words, one narrative is
more transparent than another if the reader is more interested in identifying
the narrative’s content as the same content, whatever might have replaced
the narrative’s original form. If the narrative’s content remains unaffected
despite the substitution of some of its literary qualities, the narrative is more
transparent than another in which this is not the case. While narratives are
complex entities, it is possible to respond in different ways to these complex-
ities, either by situating their meaning in the broader frame of the narrative
as a whole, or by examining their meaning in connection with the concrete
manner in which the narrative is presented. A reader who is reading for trans-
parency might thus be interested in defining the content of Kafka’s The Trial
with the general proposition that ‘human beings are victims of impersonal
and indifferent forces outside their control’, but a reader who is reading for
opacity is more interested in following the destiny of the main character Josef
K. in order to fine-tune their understanding of the meaning of the novel.11
In this regard, it is obvious that the distinction between opacity and trans-
parency delineates two different ways of relating to literary fiction, but only
the former can be said to account for the experience of reading literary fiction.
The distinction, therefore, supports the view that the cognitive value of lit-
erary fiction is intrinsic to the experience of reading literary fiction and that
it is not adequately understood when reading for opacity is confused with
reading for transparency. However, it could be asked whether it is possible
to separate the two ways of relating to literary fiction in the actual reading
process. It is not clear how a fine-grained examination of the manner in which
the novel’s content is presented can arise without – at least implicitly – the
reader’s awareness of (or search for) the novel’s content as the same content.
Re-readings, recapitulations, reformulations, thought experiments or content
examinations following alternative chronologies (to one prescribed in chapters
or events) and other kinds of substitution can support the reader’s sensitivity
to opacity. In other words, the cognitive relevance intended by reading for
transparency can at any time play a role in the experience of reading literary
fiction. Moreover, it is not yet clear in what way reading for opacity enables
literary theory to better understand the cognitive value of literary fiction.
134
Arthur Cools
In fact, by focusing on the reading experience, the opacity thesis treats the
cognitive value of literary fiction as a literary value, but it does not seem to
be able to distinguish the cognitive value from other literary values that the
reader attributes to literary fiction. It is here that the risk of formalism is the
most apparent. While reading for opacity implies the reader’s attention to
the specific manner in which the content is presented, the cognitive value of
literary fiction risks being reduced to the reader’s capability to recognise the
literary qualities and intricacies of expression. Nevertheless, one may wonder
whether this corresponds with the reader’s interest in reading literary fiction,
and whether it is not necessary to include the reader’s capability to respond
to literary fiction, in order to distinguish the cognitive value from other values
attributed to literary fiction. However, in opposing opacity to transparency,
the opacity thesis seems unable to do this or to articulate how the cognitive
value of literary fiction arises from the reading experience.
With regard to the question of the cognitive value of literary fiction, it thus
does not seem possible to separate opacity from transparency or transparency
from opacity in a non-equivocal way. This does not imply that the conceptual
distinction between the two is unfruitful. Opacity draws attention to the
importance of the experience of reading literary fiction to address the question
of its cognitive value. Transparency draws attention to the importance of the
content identity of literary fiction to support the answer to that question. One
could say that in the case of literary fiction, transparency without opacity is
empty and opacity without transparency is blind. Without the former, it
is not possible to thematise the content of the interest in reading literary
fiction; without the latter, it is not possible to appreciate the literary value of
literary fiction. As a result, we need to analyse the manner in which content
is identified within the experience of reading literary fiction to answer the
question of its cognitive value.
II. INTEREST AT A DISTANCE
Let us now turn to the experience of reading literary fiction. I approach this
experience assuming that the reader of literary fiction has a particular interest
in reading literary fiction. How can this interest be described?
There are many texts that may appeal to the interest of the reader, but
only some do so by presenting themselves as literary fiction. To distinguish
the reader’s interest as specific to literary fiction, it is important to take
into account the relation of the reader’s interest to the distinctive qualities
of literary fiction. In this way, it is possible, from the start, to avoid the
confusion between an interest in reading literary fiction and an interest in
reading for information. The majority of texts are read to obtain informa-
tion, such as scientific reports, abstracts, daily newspapers, Wikipedia pages,
dictionaries, historical documents, laws, judgments, arguments, biographies,
and others. The main feature of this kind of interest in reading texts is to
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extend knowledge on a specific given issue. The two aspects are important.
Reading for information requires that the reader already has some knowledge
about a matter and intends to apply, extend or develop this knowledge. If
I am interested in reading a newspaper article on the last elections in the
United States, for instance, it is presupposed that I know what elections are,
that I know that elections recently took place in the United States, that I am
familiar with the political opposition between Republicans and Democrats in
the United States, that I have an idea of (or an opinion about) the political
situation in the United States, and so on. Moreover, my interest in reading
the newspaper article implies that I am willing to test (and, if necessary, cor-
rect) what I already know, to adapt my view on this matter and to enrich
my understanding of it on the basis of the additional information I obtain by
reading the newspaper. Similarly, I might be interested in reading a biogra-
phy of Philip Roth. This interest requires that I already know who Philip
Roth is; for instance, I know that he is an American, that he wrote stories,
that he is the author of American Pastoral, that he won the Pulitzer Prize,
that he recently died, etc., and it also requires that I intend to know more
about his concrete life and work.
It is important to note that the interest I have in reading for information
does not primarily depend on whether the knowledge I had before reading,
or the new information I gain through reading, is right or wrong. I might
still be interested in reading about the details of Philip Roth’s life even if
the information I obtain about his marriage or about the success of his first
novel is highly disputable. Although the presentation of these facts might
be suggestive, tendentious or simply wrong, my reading for information is
defined by an interest in matters of fact.
In the case of reading literary fiction, the reader’s interest is different.
Literary fictional narrative, by its very essence, does not intend to present or
develop knowledge about matters of fact. Therefore, the two requirements
mentioned above are not relevant in the case of reading literary fiction. I
do not need any knowledge about the author, Philip Roth, or about the
political context of the United States to start reading I Married a Communist
as a literary fictional narrative, and it does not make sense to presuppose
a willingness to test or enrich the knowledge I do not have. Of course, I
may have, in many different ways, an interest in reading literary fiction in
order to develop or enrich the knowledge I already have. It is possible that
I am familiar with the work of Philip Roth but have never read I Married a
Communist and that I want to know whether the stylistic features that appear
in this novel are the same as in other narratives by Roth. In contrast, I may
be interested in the meaning of the word ‘communist’ as Roth understands it,
and therefore want to look up all the occurrences of this word in his novels.
However, this kind of interest is not directed to the literary fictional narrative
of Roth’s story as such.
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It therefore seems that if we want to approach the experience of literary
fiction, we should first of all move away from any interest in obtaining in-
formation (about matters of fact in the real world, such as the life or the
psychology of the author) from a narrative. As Ingarden states, as long as
we read literary fictional narratives as instruments which convey information,
we fail to consider them as literary artworks.12 The experience of literary fic-
tion requires an open, explorative, but non-informative attitude, which is not
interested in subordinating the narrative’s propositional content to cognitive
goals external to the reading experience. In this way, it already becomes clear
why it is important to consider the experience of reading literary fiction as
an interest at a distance: it requires first of all bracketing (or keeping at a
distance) all knowledge claims while reading fiction.
Another feature of the experience of reading literary fiction clarifies, in
a more radical way, why the interest in reading fiction involves a kind of
distance. A literary fictional narrative is multilayered: it combines differ-
ent expressive, stylistic, rhythmic, figurative, temporal, semantic, logical and
referential dimensions. The reader’s attention is not limited to one of these
layers but, on the contrary, is triggered by and directed to the interaction
and connection between them. For this reason, it is generally accepted that
the experience of literary fiction should be considered as a complex whole.13
The importance of wholeness to the experience of reading literary fiction is
acknowledged in the contemporary debate about literary fiction. In ‘Imagina-
tion and Fiction’, for example, Kathleen Stock argues that ‘the correct focus
[of reading a literary fictional narrative] is the text as a whole’.14 The no-
tion of the ‘whole’ enables her to distinguish between imagination and belief,
and by extension between fictional and non-fictional narratives, or aspects of
them. Literary fictional narratives invite the reader to imagine its content
(and not to believe in the related event) and it is precisely for that reason
that the reader’s focus is directed to the narrative as a whole. While ‘parts of
a fictional text can be believed true by the reader (and be true, and included
for truth-related reasons), the whole cannot. For this would normally make
it impossible for the reader to imagine its content’.15
In a traditional formalist approach, the notion of a whole is understood as
the pre-given enclosing form of the literary artwork.16 However, this approach
cannot account for the reader’s experience. From the reader’s perspective,
the whole of the literary fictional narrative is not given and never given as
such for the duration of the reading experience. This means that the reader,
while reading literary fiction and focusing on the connection and interaction
between the different layers in the fictional narrative, does not have the whole
at their disposal in order to define, fix or enclose this interaction. In other
words, from the reader’s perspective, the literary fictional narrative as a whole
is always at a distance, even though the reader’s attention is directed to it.
What is said here in a general way about the reader’s interest in literary
fiction can be elaborated in more detail by pointing to some essential features
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of the reading experience. If it is correct to say that the focus of reading a
literary fictional narrative is the text as a whole, then the reader’s interest in
reading literary fiction is not satisfied by or limited to the content of one, or
some, propositions in, or about, the fictional narrative. The reader’s interest
is directed beyond the proposition read (and the propositional content) to-
ward propositions that follow or preceded, and there is no single sentence in
the narrative that may stop this movement of attention that is given to the
narrative as a whole. In this way, reading literary fiction differs from read-
ing for information. A reader who wants to obtain information from a text
is looking for the propositional content which fulfils the cognitive intention
of reading. From this perspective, it is evident that sentences are evaluated
with regard to their importance in relation to obtaining the required infor-
mation, identifying those which add to the knowledge already acquired and
distinguishing them from others which are not. This kind of evaluation does
not qualify the reader’s experience of literary fiction, where every sentence, or
even every single sign, may count. The reason for this is simple: the meaning
of a sentence in – and more generally, its contribution to – a fictional nar-
rative depends on the other sentences in the narrative. The trivial sentence:
‘He is looking through the window’ in a narrative by Franz Kafka may re-
ceive a non-trivial (and even dense) significance which the reader can only
discover through the experience of reading the fictional narrative as a whole;
for example, ‘he is witnessing a murder’.17
That the reader’s interest in literary fiction is directed beyond the single
proposition, toward the fictional narrative as a whole does not mean that the
reader’s attention is limited to discovering the propositional content of each
successive sentence (until the final sentence at the end of the text). The focus
on the fictional narrative as a whole changes the way the reader attends to
the propositional content of each sentence.
Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic approach to literary fiction can help us to
adequately describe this change and to better understand the movement of
attention that leads beyond the single proposition in the experience of read-
ing literary fiction. In Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of
Meaning, he points to the alteration of reference in literary fictional narra-
tives. He defines ‘reference’ in line with Frege’s notion of ‘Bedeutung’, the
‘about what’ of a proposition.18 Reference leads the sentence beyond itself:
it relates language to the world and enables the identification of an individ-
ual in the factual world. In oral language, reference relies on ‘monstration’:
the references included through demonstratives, adverbs of time and place,
and the tenses of the verb are defined by the dialogical situation common
to the speaker and the listener and may be supported by gestural indica-
tion. This possibility of monstration disappears in written texts. However,
descriptive, non-fictional writing, such as diaries, letters, travel reports, his-
torical narratives and testimonies, intend to restore the ostensive reference
of oral discourse and may do so ‘thanks to the ordinary procedures of identi-
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fication [. . . ], the unique spatio-temporal network to which both writer and
reader belong and which they both acknowledge.’19 In other words, in descrip-
tive non-fictional texts, the writer intends each written sentence to be read
as an utterance of the writer and it remains possible for the reader to thus
define its reference in accordance with the writer’s situation. The reader is
able to locate a determinable historical time and place, and in this way iden-
tify the intention of the writer through each written sentence. This potential
disappears in literary fictional narratives, that is – as Ricoeur specifies – ‘in
narratives that are not descriptive reports where a narrative time, expressed
by specific tenses of the verbs, is displayed by and within the narrative with-
out any connection to the unique space-time network common to ostensive
and non-ostensive description.’20
At first sight, Ricoeur seems to be saying something trivial, which Roman
Jakobson has called the priority of the poetic function of language at the ex-
pense of its referential function in literary fiction. However, the specificity of
the reader’s interest in literary fiction is not sufficiently clarified by pointing
to its focus on the poetic or literary qualities of language. These qualities
may be equally present in non-fictive descriptions. Ricoeur’s approach sheds
more precise light on the reader’s interest in reading literary fiction. The
movement of attention that leads beyond the proposition toward the narra-
tive as a whole has its origin in the impossibility of defining the referential
function of the proposition in fictional narratives in a non-ambiguous way.
The reader’s interest in reading literary fiction concerns this change of refer-
ence. The reader’s attention is freed from the limitations of ‘the procedures
of identification’ that enable them to understand a written sentence as an ut-
terance of the writer, and to define the reference of the utterance in relation
to the factual world, as is the case in a non-fictional ostensive or descriptive
context. In this regard, it is the experience of a certain absence – the absence
of a referential matching of the proposition to the factual world – that triggers
the reader’s attention in fictional narratives, provoking an ongoing search for
meaning beyond each sentence, which is directed toward the narrative as a
whole.
In the wake of Aristotle’s adage that poetics is closer to philosophy than
history is, it is often stated and generally accepted that literary fiction deals
with a possible world and not with the factual world. However, this distinc-
tion as such does not clarify why we are interested in reading literary fiction.
We may be interested in a thought experiment – that includes the representa-
tion of a possible world – for completely different reasons to reading literary
fiction; for example, because we want to test the value of an argument that
we acknowledge, and in the frame of which the thought experiment has been
formulated. In fact, the formulation of a thought experiment is still, or can in
principle be, connected to a non-fictive common situation. In addition, and
in reverse, the reader may be interested in reading a work as literary fiction
despite the writer including careful descriptions of experiences he or she had
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in the factual world within the fictional narrative. In other words, the fic-
tional character of a narrative as a whole does not depend on whether each
experience described in the narrative is part of an exclusively non-factual,
possible world. The distinction between possible and factual (worlds) is not
sufficient to identify the specific interest of the reader in literary fiction. It is
therefore necessary to further examine how the change of reference in literary
fiction concerns the reading experience.
The impossibility – mentioned above – of defining the referential function
of a proposition in a fictional narrative in a non-ambiguous way implies that
a proposition in a story is not and cannot be understood as an utterance or
a speech act of the writer. The proposition in literary fiction is freed, so to
speak, from the situational constraints and limitations which might define
the writer’s intention. In the experience of reading literary fiction, the reader
does not understand the sentences in the story as the expression of the here
and now of the writer. The sentences are given to the reader without the
sender being identified. What narrative theory calls ‘the narrator’ and/or
‘the narrative voice’, deals with this aspect of the reading experience. A
sentence in a fictional story presents a content to the reader without mani-
festing the intention with which, the perspective from which, and the context
in which, the sentence was formulated. The narrator and/or the narrative
voice are the names of this void, which accompanies each sentence within the
fictional narrative, despite the narrator possibly being designated in the first
person in the story. What we call here the ‘void’ does not mean that a sen-
tence in a fictional narrative has no intention, no perspective and no context,
but that these are not evidently given or identifiable in literary fiction. In
this respect, they must be examined, discovered and interpreted through the
reading experience.
Based on this well-known narrative condition of literary fiction, some cog-
nitive features of the reading experience can be articulated more precisely.
First, it is possible to say something more about the reader’s interest in read-
ing literary fiction. This interest is qualified by the search to fill the void, to
explore the context within the fictional narrative, to identify the perspective
of the narrator and/or narrative voice, and to wonder what the fictional nar-
rative precisely intends to draw our attention to. These different, although
complementary directions of the reader’s interest in reading literary fiction
require skills and competencies, such as being sensitive to the mostly implicit
relations between reasons and beliefs, between motives and actions, between
characters and values; being able to differentiate between significance and
insignificance, between goals and means, between norms and facts, between
evaluative and descriptive expressions; and being able to reflect on the con-
nection between these aspects and their consequences, on the kind of world
that is represented in this way, and whether or not and to what extent the
meaning of this world is intended as such. It might be clear by now why
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the reader’s interest in literary fiction is not adequately described as mere
attention to poetic and literary qualities of language.
Second, it is possible to say something more about the reader’s attention
that is directed beyond the proposition toward the narrative as a whole.
The focus on the narrative as a whole defines the role of the imagination in
reading literary fiction. The narrative as a whole is to be imagined. It is
not something that finally appears at the end of the narrative with the final
sentence, or that manifests itself through the plot, which integrates characters
and actions within a narrative unity. In other words, to imagine the narrative
as a whole is an intrinsic feature of the experience of reading literary fiction.
It transforms this reading experience into an ongoing exploration, not only of
the multiple connections between sentences composing the fictional narrative
but also of the consistency and valorisation of the imagined content. In non-
fictive narratives, the reader’s attention is directed to, and satisfied by, the
descriptions of the narrated events, which are understood as true or faithful
expressions of the writer’s experience or research (e.g., as in travel reports,
testimonies, historical documents). If the narrative as a whole comes into play
in the case of reading non-fiction, it is in order to validate or to question the
descriptive intention of the narrative, or because literary means of fictional
narratives (e.g., a plot structure) have been used in presenting the narrated
events.
A similar change, but in the opposite direction, may occur in the expe-
rience of reading literary fiction. Although a narrative may present itself as
fictional and invite the reader to imagine its content and explore the narrative
as a whole, the reader may come to acknowledge through the reading expe-
rience that the narration is written as an autobiographical report of events
in the factual world and that the perspective of the narrator is identical with
the writer’s expressions in daily life (e.g., in the novel I.M. by Conny Pal-
men or the novels of Karl Ove Knausgard). In this case, the reader’s interest
in reading literary fiction will be deceived. However, this possibility shows
that the reader’s attention to the narrative as a whole in the case of literary
fictional narratives is not exclusively focused on the use of literary means,
but also remains directed to the referential means of language in narratives.
It is thus necessary to recall attention to the narrative as a whole in order
to understand that reading for opacity is not necessarily opposed to reading
for transparency, but that both are integrated into the experience of reading
literary fictional narratives.
Finally, another important consequence concerning the reading experience
can be drawn from the narrative condition of literary fiction mentioned above.
If it is the case, as was argued, that the reader’s interest in literary fiction is
qualified by a kind of distance with regard to the narrative, and if, moreover,
the reader’s response to this distance is to imagine the narrative as a whole,
it follows that the reader’s own experience has a privileged significance in
the experience of reading literary fiction. Without doubt, and as a matter
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of fact, descriptions of experiences or events in literary fictional narratives
do not refer to the reader’s own experience or to real events in the reader’s
life. However, it is the reader who is invited to imagine the content of the
narrative as a whole, and this means that it is the reader who fills in the many
undefined connections between the propositions of the fictional narrative. It is
the reader who represents the fictional world as explored through the process
of reading the narrative as a whole, and who evaluates the aesthetic, poetic
and cognitive qualities of this exploration, as well as the consistency, relevance
and meaningfulness of the world discovered through this exploration, and the
intrinsic and extrinsic features of the literary fictional narrative.
The reader’s own experience is implied in the process of reading literary
fiction in two different ways. On the one hand, it guides this process and
is engaged in the activity of imagination, which contributes to the selection
of the relevant connections between propositions, defines the content of the
reading experience, and delivers vivid imaginaries of the unfamiliar. On the
other hand, the reader’s experience is itself at stake in the reading process, in
the sense of becoming manifest, being discovered and ultimately questioned.
In the reading process, the reader finds him or herself feeling sympathy, or not,
with a character; feeling happiness or sadness about the character’s destiny;
being disgusted or attracted to the description of the interaction between
two characters; agreeing with or rejecting the central convictions and beliefs
ascribed to a character; reflecting on or being captivated by the reasons that
may explain the character’s emotions and actions; or anticipating or lacking
interest in the ending of the story.
In this regard, reading literary fiction is always a kind of self-exploration;
an exploration which, on the one hand, presupposes various cognitive and
linguistic competencies based on the reader’s own experience of the world
and their interactions in the world, but which, on the other hand, manifests
to the reader their own fantasies, feelings, emotions, convictions, beliefs and
representations with regard to fictional entities. For this reason, it is possible
to describe this exploration as a practice, the goal of which is not be informed,
but to imagine, to reflect and to evaluate, and it is not erroneous to ascribe
a cognitive relevance to this practice, including a learning effect, insofar as
it addresses the reader’s competencies in understanding meanings, stimulates
the creativity of the imagination, triggers the act of evaluation, increases
awareness about the many facets of their own singular experience of living
in a human world, and the complexity of its linguistic expression. However,
it would be incorrect to overestimate this learning as a new way of concep-
tualising the world,21 or as the achievement of a new knowledge concerning
what it is like to be in the situation narrated by a fictional story,22 or as the
exercise of a practical wisdom that learns from literary fiction how to apply
moral rules to concrete cases in real life.23 The problem with this cognitive
overestimation of literary fiction is that it does not account for the reader’s
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interest in reading literary fiction as such, the intention of which is not to
discover a new idea, or to acquire knowledge about the other’s sensibility, or
to apply moral rules.
The naivety of these views is most apparent in the presupposition that the
cognitive value of literary fiction can be measured by a change in the reader’s
relation to the real world beyond the experience of reading literary fiction.
However, there is no evidence for this kind of change. As I have argued in
this section, in the experience of literary fiction, the reader’s interest is freed
from the limitations of the ostensive and descriptive references in the case of
factual contexts and is directed to the narrative as a whole. The claim that
the reader who enjoys reading literary fiction responds to this experience by
adapting their own convictions about the real world, or by understanding
the other person better, or by learning how to morally decide in the context
of the lifeworld, mistakes the reader’s response to literary fiction and fails
to account for the cognitive value that is intrinsic to the reading experience
itself.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By no means did I intend to give a full account of the experience of reading
literary fiction in this article. The intention was more limited, addressing the
question of the cognitive value of literary fiction based on Peter Lamarque’s
opacity thesis. It is my contention that the opacity thesis draws attention
to the reader’s experience of literary fiction and invites a reconsideration of
the cognitive value of literary fiction within this experience. To this end, I
addressed the question of the reader’s interest in reading literary fiction and
described this as an interest at a distance. In accordance with the opacity
thesis, the notion of ‘distance’ emphasises that the interest in reading literary
fiction is related to the intrinsic value of the experience of reading literary
fiction. In doing so, it was possible to distinguish the reader’s interest in
literary fiction from an interest in reading for information. Furthermore, it
was possible to clarify the kind of distance that is involved in the experience of
reading literary fiction by means of Roman Ingarden’s and Kathleen Stock’s
observations, both of which suggest that a focus on the literary narrative as
a whole distinguishes the experience of reading literary fiction from that of
reading non-fictional narratives. I argued that this focus on the narrative
as a whole leads beyond a propositional understanding of the experience of
literary fiction.
While, as Paul Ricoeur has shown, the propositional content in literary
fictional narrative is freed from the limitations imposed by ostensive and de-
scriptive references in the case of factual context, the narrative as a whole
is not given to the reader as such and never definable in terms of a proposi-
tion. Consequently, the reader’s interest in reading literary fiction is triggered
by the search to fill in the referential indeterminacies which accompany each
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sentence in a literary fictional narrative. In other words, literary fictional nar-
ratives invite the reader to explore the context and development of meanings
within the fictional narrative as a whole, to examine the narrator’s intended
perspectives within the narrative’s modes of presentation, and to discover,
interpret and evaluate the content to which the fictional narrative as a whole
intends to draw attention. In this way, the examination of the reader’s interest
in literary fiction in terms of an interest at a distance enabled the articulation
of the cognitive value of literary fiction in accordance with the opacity thesis
and allowed us to avoid the pitfalls of formalism, to which the opacity thesis
risks being reduced. In the case of literary fiction, the reader’s attention to the
narrative’s modes of presentation implies (and is supported by) the reader’s
focus on content identity regarding the narrative as a whole and vice versa.
This outcome may help to better understand how cognitive, aesthetic and
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